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1.

County's Brief Discussed
A. Statement of Facts Relevant to Reply Brief:
Because Smith is not contesting in any way the findings or conclusions of the
District Judge, and the County has not appealed those issues, it is unnecessary for
Smith to include them in the record. As a result, the following are deemed admitted for
purposes of this case:
1.

The application for building permit and the septic permit were submitted by

Smith:
a. "lengthy delay during which the County took no action on the

application for a building permit." Tr. Page 000062.
b. See also County's answer at Tr. Page 000014: "Plaintiff has
appealed the decision denying the building permit to the Washington
County Board of Commissioners and the Commissioners have not
made a decision on that appeal."
2.

There was never a determination made on David Smith's application for a

building permit because the County was waiting for legal advice. See 1.a and 1.b
above.
3.

There was no portion of David Smith's driveway which would have made

the County's ordinance applicable to his single residence. See Tr. at page 000063 as
follows: "There is no code that addresses the minimum width for a driveway providing
access to only one house, as is the case here." See also Tr. at page 19, lines 3-6
where Chuck Kroll stated: "And I agree with counsel that there is nothing in the County
ordinance that talks about single driveways, the direction is either a private road or to
driveways sewing two people."
Appellant's Reply Brief

The P & Z advised David Smith that the County has an unwritten policy to

4.

require a residential owner to get permission from the local fire district in order to grant a
building permit.
5.

David Smith attended the Midvale Fire District meeting which refused to

grant permission to David Smith to have a driveway 16 feet in width.

6.

Sixteen feet driveway width is the requirement of all the other fire districts

in the County of Washington, specifically the Weiser Fire District and the Cambridge
Fire District. Tr. page 000063-000064 states:
"However, the evidence presented indicates that there is confusion and a lack of
uniformity between the fire districts within Washington County as to the
interpretation and application of the IFC. This conflict in combination with the
actions of the Commissioners in failing to hold the required hearings and failing
to maintain documentation, leads to the conclusion that the decisions to deny the
permit and variance are not only not supported by substantial evidence, but are
likewise arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion."
The problem with the County's Answer, as set forth above, is they never made a
written decision upon which to proceed, and had not, as of the time of the Court's
Memorandum Decision, made a decision on the building permit.
As the District Judge found, the procedure used by the County in this case was
difficult to figure out. It took between 1% and 2 years to get a simple building permit.
There is no "record in the usual sense because of the failure of the County to
hold any hearing for which testimony could have been adduced.

Appellant's Reply Brief

ARGUMENT
1.
MANDAMUS COMPLAINT WAS NOT APPEALED
A. The issues surrounding the mandamus complaint were not appealed
and are therefore beyond the scope of this appeal.
The County attempts to raise the issue of the ripeness of the mandamus
complaint and the change of the complaint to a petition for judicial review. The County
attempts to do so upon appeal, without appealing that, or any other issue. The only
issue before the Court is the issue of attorney's fees and costs.
A long standing rule of this Court does not ailow a party to raise issues in an
appeal which were not the subject of a cross appeal. Lepel, supra.
Furthermore, the claim that arose in the substantive portion of this case dealt not
with a discretionary act, but dealt instead with the clear language of the County's own
ordinance. David Smith sought to compel the County to do what it's own ordinance
unambiguously required it to do.
Finally, the failure to grant a building permit to David Smith was a violation of a
constitutionally protected right, not a mere privilege as claimed by the County.

THE COUNTY'S ARGUMENT THAT DAVID FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS WITHOUT MERIT

A.

The Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

The County's assertion that David Smith failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies is not properly before this Court. The County failed to preserve that issue on
Appellant's Reply Brief
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appeal. For the same reasons set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Brief, the
failure to preserve this issue on appeal is fatal to the County. See Lepel v Lepel, 93
ldaho 82 (1969) which held as follows:
Respondent, in his brief, questioned the award of attorney's fees to
appellant. No cross-appeal was filed, and appellant made timely objection to this
procedure by way of a motion to strike. If a respondent, in an appeal, desires to
have errors against himself corrected, he must present them to this court by way
of cross-appeal. Coffin v. Bradbury, 3 ldaho 770, 35 P. 715, 95 Am.St.Rep. 37
(1894); Harrington v. Hayden, 69 ldaho 22, 202 P.2d 236 (1949); Chaney v.
Village of Middleton, 58 ldaho 289, 72 P.2d 850 (1937). Furthermore, a review of
the ldaho statutory and case law reveals that the court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Mrs. Lepel, even though Mr. Lepel was
the prevailing party. I.C. ?j32-724; Riggers v. Riggers, 82 ldaho 570, 347 P.2d
762 (1959).
Additional cases holding failure to cross-appeal is fatal to any request to assign
error. Hoopes v. Hoopes, 124 ldaho 518 (Idaho App., 1993); Bates v. State, 106
ldaho 395 (Idaho App., 1984) ; Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club o f Coeur
D'Alene, Ltd., 116 ldaho 219 (Idaho, 1989) ; and Beesley v. Beesley, 114 ldaho 536
(Idaho, 1988) .

B.

The County Failed to Take .Action on David Smith's Request For A
Building Permit And The Variance Petition.

The law is clear that if an agency fails to take action on a matter properly put
before it, that inaction is deemed to be a denial. The purpose of the rule of law is
exemplified by the County's action (or inaction) in the present case.
David Smith filed a request for a building permit which was not denied or
granted. In the interim, the County suggested that David file a request of variance.
Despite the suggestion, and David's compliance, the County failed to make a decision
Appellant's Reply Brief
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on it as well. In fact, the District Judge had to order a decision to be made on the
variance petition, so David could exhaust his administrative remedies. Without that
order, it is clear the County would have continued to do nothing. Each time David
requested a decision from the County, he was told it would be discussed with the
County's attorney. Because of the inaction of the County on both the issuance of a
building permit, and the variance request, David Smith was unable to exhaust the
administrative remedies. As a matter of fact, it was the County which failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies required by the County's own law.
Under circumstance such as those in the case at bar, ldaho Code 67-5271(1)
provides that a party may obtain direct review from a preliminary, procedural, or
intermediate agency action. The APA by its own terms does not preclude the use of the
common law prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Michael S.
Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The ldaho Administrative Procedure Act: A P r h e r for
fhe Practitioner, 30 ldaho L. Rev. 273, 351(1993).

THE RECORD IS SUFFICIENT FOR THIS APPEAL
A. Smith Requested All Affidavits and Memorandums.
In the Amended Notice of Appeal, Smith requested the full record on appeal
together with:
"c. All Memorandums, Briefs, Affidavits (including the Affidavit of Tim Helfrich
and Affidavits of R. Brad Masingill regarding attorney's fees and costs),
Complaint, and all other documents in the record of the entire proceeding,
Appellant's Reply Brief
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including but not limited to the hearing dated September 5, 2008, hearing
dated May 27, 2008, and hearing dated April 14, 2008."
Any failure to include documents in the record was clearly not the fault of the
Appellant. The reason for wanting the Memorandums, Briefs, and Affidavits to be
included in the record was two-fold. First, this case involved no hearings so there was
no factual transcript which is normally a part of the record on appeal and, second, the
Affidavits, Memorandums, and Briefs include all the documents and facts discussed by
the trial judge.

B. The Record is Adequate Without the Requested Documents:
The case before the Court is adequate to make a determination on the attorney
fee issue despite the lack of some of the documents. The issue before the court
involves only a determination if the County's position in the case was (1) without a
reasonable legal basis or without a reasonable factual basis.

Interpretation of an

ordinance is an issue of law, over which both the district court and this Court exercise
free review. Ada County v Gibson, 126 Idaho 854 (Ct. App. 1995).
it is respectively submitted that the district judge's determinations that the
County's actions were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and violated their
own procedural rules, being not contested by the County, are admitted and cannot be
contested at this stage. The Court is simply left with a decision why the attorney's fees
were not granted despite uncontradicted findings of fact and conclusions of law which
clearly warrant an award.

Appellant's Reply Brief

C. De Novo Review:

The County claims the posture of the proceeding before this Court is one of de
novo review.

In Fischer v City of Ketchurn, 141 ldaho 349 (2005), this Court

determined that it will exercise free review over the decisions of the district court
applying ldaho Code 12-117. This is an appeal from a decision by the trial court over
the district court's decision on an award of attorney's fees, and Fischer, supra, controls.

D.

Documents:

The County contends its needs documents to attack the underlying findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The County failed to request those documents to be
included in the record. Smith is not contesting those findings, and it is not Smith's
obligation to request documents helpful, or not helpful, to the County.

The County argues that the district court should have followed a different
procedure in the underlying case. However, as is the case with all the prior contentions
of the County, those issues have not been preserved in the appeal, and are not properly
before this Court. Lepel, supra.

IDAHO CODE 12-120
Although not the most pertinent of the code sections upon which Smith bases his
appeal, ldaho Code 12-120(3) is applicable to this case. Contrary to the County's
claim, the issue decided by the trial judge was not whether a fee for a service was
Appellant's Reply Brief
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necessary. The issue is the obstruction by the County of Smith's absolute right to
issuance of the permit so long as he complied with the obligations set out in the
ordinance. In the instant case, it is undisputed Smith followed all the requirements of
the County's ordinance.
It is further uncontradicted that despite his compliance, the County then required
Smith to (1) seek consent by the Midvale Fire District on two separate occasions, (2)
failed to grant or deny the issuance of the building permit, (3) failed to grant or deny
Smith's request for a variance, (4) failed to issue a written decision upon which Smith
could appeal the denial of his building permit, and (5) during the entire process
continued to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the County's own
applicable ordinance.

It was the absolute failure of the County to act on the lawful

requests by Smith, which is the gravamen of the case before this Court.

To simply

contend this was a "fee for service" issue is intellectually dishonest. It also implies the
Court can ignore the findings and conclusions of the trial court. The non-appealed
findings and conclusions reveal the County simply bowed its neck and refused to follow
its own procedures, thus leaving Smith without a remedy. The trial court so found, and
the uncontradicted record amply demonstrates the ordinance in question does not apply
to a driveway to one home.

v.
IDAHO CODE 12-117
A. County's Interpretation of It's Own Ordinance

Appellant's Reply Brief

12

On appeal, the County again argues its ordinance, Section B of Tifle 5-3-5, is
applicable to a driveway to a single residence. Because the County has not appealed
that determination by the trial judge, it has no legal right to argue it is ambiguous.
In the County's brief, the County fails to make a distinction between the two
separate elements of ldaho Code 12-117. A violation of either element entitles Smith
to an award of attorney's fees.
In The J & M Realty Company v Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of
Norwalk, 286 A. 2d 317, 319 (Conn. 1971), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a

governing board may not interpret its zoning regulations beyond the "fair import" of the
language.

Furthermore, this Court has stated an ambiguity is not established merely

because the parties present differing ~nterpretationsto the Court.

Payeffe River

Property Owners Ass'n v Board of Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551

(1999)
In County Residents Against Po/Iufion from Septage Sludge v Bonner
County, 138 ldaho 585 (2003), this Court overturned an improper interpretation of the

Bonner County appeal ordinance. In the Couftty Residents case, Bonner County
argued that it had the right to dismiss an appeal under its "no lawful grounds" ordinance
simply if it did not want to hear it.

This Court awarded attorney's fees to the residents

because of the county's interpretation.

The same case is presented herein. The

County of Washington is solely responsible for the language in its ordinances. It is not,
however, entitled to ignore the plain meaning thereof.
The ordinance in question (Section B of Title 5-3-5 of the Washington County
Code) is again set out as follows:
Appellant's Reply Brief
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"Private Driveways: All private driveways sewing two (2) houses shall have a
recorded easement of at least twenty six feet (26') with twenty feet (20') of
finished roadway meeting county or road district standards for road construction,
excluding paving, or must meet standards of the fire department having
jurisdiction, if more stringent. (Ord. 51, 9-2-2003)" (emphasis added).
The district judge reviewed the ordinance, listened to the arguments of counsel,
and properly concluded that the ordinance does not apply to a driveway to a single
residence. See Tr. at page 000063 as follows:
"There is no code that addresses the minimum width for a driveway providing
access to only one house, as is the case here."
The County's suggestion that a very small portion of the driveway being used by
Smith and his neighbor is of no moment. First, that small portion was in existence prior
to Smith's purchase of his property, and it is in excess of the 20 foot width requirement
of the District. Additionally, the trial judge found Smith's driveway was to a single home,
a finding not appealed by the County.
In fact, the County's counsel, Charles Kroll, agreed the ordinance did not apply to
a driveway to a single residence during oral argument to the district judge.

See Tr. at

page 19, lines 3-6 where Chuck Kroll stated:
"And I aaree with counsel that there is nothina in the Countv ordinance
that talks-about single driveways, the direction is either a privaie road or to
driveways serving two people." (emphasis added).

Despite Kroll's concession, and despite the language everyone except the
County officials themselves could easily understand, the County's adherence to its
position that the ordinance required a 20 foot driveway width was, and still is, an
unreasonable position not supported by the existing law or the existing facts as found by
the trial judge. This Court should have the same reaction to that contention as did the
district judge. To blatantly disregard, to the extreme prejudice of David Smith and his
Appellant's Reply Brief
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family, the ordinary and unambiguous language of its own ordinance, even when faced
with its own counsel's admission in open court to the contrary, is frivolous, is an
unreasonable interpretation without any basis in law, and an unreasonable
interpretation without any basis in fact. The County's failure to admit its legal and
factual position was erroneous caused David Smith and his family to incur attorney's
fees in this case. This case exemplifies why ldaho Code 12-117 was enacted.
The County continues its assault on the truth when it contends in this proceeding
that the ordinance is ambiguous in some way. The Court of Appeals in Sf. Benedict's
Hosp. v. Twin Falls County, 107 ldaho 143 (Idaho App., 1984) stated as follows about

the legislative intent in interpreting a statute:
"Indicia of legislative intent may be "collected from the context [of a statute], from
the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the remedy in
view." Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 ldaho 364, 367, 421 P.2d 444, 447
9021."
(1966) (quoting Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S.E. 910, 912 [I

The words of the ordinance, not the County's strained construction thereof, are
what the public must abide by.

Frankly, the County has no right to criticize David

Smith for being unable to comply with an ordinance the County cannot seem to
understand. That defense by the County is so preposterous no legal precedent for it
exists.
The County's failure to follow its own procedures, and its noticing hearings only
to cancel them, as found by the trial court, is not something Smith had any control over.
It is likely the continued claim by the County that it needed to seek legal advice, and the
length of time involved in getting an answer to its questions from its counsel, is likely to
AppeIIant's Reply Brief
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have been because its counsel could not find a way to interpret its ordinances the way it
wanted.
reasonable
ldaho Code 12-117 provides that if the County acts without a (I)
basis in fact or (2) a reasonable basis in law, attorney's fees are mandated. The Court
should notice that nowhere in the County's brief does the language used by the district
court describing the conduct of the County appear.

The County does not want to

discuss the legal and factual determinations by the Court, as they are contrary to the
County's arguments before this Court. The County did not appeal any of those findings
or conclusions. Thus, as previously pointed out, they are not subject to dispute at this
stage of the proceedings.

VI.
Two Prongs Not Ruled Upon by Trial Court:
Idaho Code 12-117 reads as follows:
"In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court
ghalJ award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."

It appears the district judge did not fully understand what factors ldaho Code 12-

117 requires. There are two, not one, prongs of ldaho Code 12-117. For Smith to be

Appellant's Reply Brief
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awarded attorney's fees, all Smith is required to show is a violation of "either" of the two
prongs of ldaho Code 12-117.
This Court set forth in Reardon v Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140
ldaho 115 (2004), the reason for ldaho Code 12-117as follows:
"The purpose of ldaho Code 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves as a deterrent
to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and second, it provides a remedy
for person who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending
against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies
should have made. An award of attorney's fees under ldaho Code 12-117
has been distilled into a two-part test. Attorney's fees must be awarded if (1)
the Court finds in favor of the person, and (2) the City or County acted without
a reasonable basis in fact or law."

The district court found the actions of Washington County to be arbitrary.
According to Reardon, supra, that finding triggers ldaho Code 12-117.
This Court has further noted that where the requirements of the statute are met,
an award of attorney's fees is mandatory, not discretionary. Rincover v State of ldaho
Dep't of Finance, 132 ldaho 547 (1999) and Fischer, supra.

Despite cases in which attorney's fees under ldaho Code 12-117 have been
either denied or granted by this Court, there is very little discussion of the standards or
definitions of the words therein. For instance, there is no discussion this writer could
locate where this Court has discussed the disjunctive nature of the statute, nor has
there been a discussion of what findings will justify an award.

While this Court

exercises free review over the district court's application of ldaho Code 12-117
(Fischer, supra), the answer to the issues in this case have not been discussed in a

manner helpful to the members of the bar.
AppeUant's Reply Brief
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As to other statutes involving words in a disjunctive, the common statement by
this Court has been:
"The word "or" is defined as "a function word to indicate (1) an alternative
between different or unlike things, states, or actions ...; (2) [a] choice between
alternative things, states, or courses...." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has
concluded that the word "or" should be given its normal disjunctive meaning,
unless that meaning would result in absurdity or produce an unreasonable result.
Filer Mutual Telephone Co. v. ldaho State Tax Commission, 76 ldaho 256, 261,
28? P.2d 478,481 (1955).
The statute here is unambiguous when the word "or" is given its disjunctive
meaning. The statute can be violated by "any person who shall ... unlawfully
exercise or attempt to exercise the functions of ... a policeman, ... or any person
... who shall bring or cause to be brought ... into this state any armed or unarmed
police force...." I.C. § 18-711 (emphasis added). The bolded "or" separates the
two primary manners in which this statute can be violated. Under the first part, a
person can violate the statute by exercising or attempting to exercise the
functions of or holding himself or herself out to anyone as one of the delineated
law officials. Under the second part, the statute is violated when a person, acting
on his or her own behalf, or as an officer, or as an agent for another or a
company, brings or aids in bringing an armed or unarmed police force or body of
men into the state. State v. Rivera, 131 ldaho 8 (Idaho App., 1998)."
If the statute had an "and" between the two prongs, Smith would have been
required to show that the County had no reasonable basis in law

fact in order to

recover attorney's fees. Since the statute is phrased in the disjunctive, Smith is only
obligated to prevail on one of the two prongs. Those prongs are discussed next.

A. No Basis in Fact:

In this case, the district judge found that the County:

I. Failed to follow its own ordinance; and
2. Misinterpreted its own ordinance; and

3. Failed to follow its own procedures; and
4. Lost documents: and
Appellant's Reply Brief
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5. Noticed hearings which were never held; and

6. Abused its discretion; and

7. Acted arbitrarily; and
8. Acted capriciously; and
9. Acted without substantial evidence.

Any one of the foregoing findings conclusively proves the County acted without a
reasonable basis in fact.
B. Without a Basis in Law:

In addition to the foregoing, the conclusions of

the district judge are:
1. the County failed to evaluate the applications upon a non-

conflicting standard; and
2. violated a substantial right of Smith; and
3. held proceedings which were in shambles; and

4. followed a policy which was confusing; and
5. The policies were not applied uniformly within the County.

The County actions found by the district judge are actions taken without a
reasonable basis in law.
C.

Reasonableness:

Idaho Code 12-117 places a "reasonableness"

standard on the County's conduct. All Smith is required to do is show the County's
actions were not reasonable as to either of the two prongs, i.e. law or fact.

It is

respectfully submitted that the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district
Appellant's Reply Brief
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judge cannot be considered reasonable acts or policy by the County.

The "abuse of

discretion" finding alone makes the decision by the County "unreasonable". Adding
"arbitrary", "capricious", "confusing", "with lack of uniformity", "failing to hold hearings",
"losing documents", and "not supported by substantial evidence" to the "abuse of
discretion" finding, makes it impossible, as a matter of law, to conclude the County
acted "reasonable", factually or legally. In fact, the Court found:
"the procedural course of this case is in shamble. Documents were lost,
hearings advertised and not held, procedures not followed, and the like." Tr. at
000063.

In St. Benedicts, supra, the Court of Appeals discussed the difficult position an
applicant is in when no decision is made and time continues to go by:
"ldaho Code § 67-5215(a) provides that such a petition for judicial review may be
.filed by a person "aggrieved" by a final decision of the administrative agency. In
order for a person to know whether or not he is "aggrieved" by administrative
action, he must know what that action is. A notice of nonaction would not suffice,
unless failure to act carried a specific, dispositive consequence. By parity of
reasoning, failure to give the notice itself would leave an applicant in limbo unless
it carried a discrete consequence."
The foregoing findings are clearly not consistent with "reasonableness" and can
only be, by parity of reasoning, "unreasonable". They show the untenable position in
which David found himself. Non-action is unreasonable, and unreasonableness is the
common trigger for application of the two prongs of ldaho Code 12-117.

D. Judge's Findings re ldaho Code 12-117:
It appears the district judge applied the wrong standard. The correct standard is
whether the County's actions were without a reasonable basis in "law", or without a
Appellant's Reply Brief
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reasonable basis in "fact". The Court simply failed to consider either of the two prongs
of ldaho Code

12-117, but instead applied the standard in ldaho Code

12-121,

frivolity.
In the Court's findings immediately following the argument on the attorney fee
motion, the district judge stated:
"...Idaho doesn't follow the English rule, it follows the American rule in which you
get no attorney's fees unless provided for by statute or contract. Mr. Masingill
correctly states that 12-117 and 12-120 have both set forth a threshold on which
one may secure fees. In this Court's view they both rise to the level of
frivolity, and there is no construction of these facts that I can find that the
Countv defended frivolouslv in anv means, it's just a matter of confusion.
The application for attorney fees will be denied." (emphasis added) Tr. at page
37, lines 23-25, and page 38, lines 1-11.
At the hearing on the issue of attorney's fees, the trial judge simply applied the
"frivolous" standard applicable to ldaho Code 12-121,concluding the County's defense
did not rise to the level of "frivolity". It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing is not
the standard under ldaho Code 12-117.
The district judge's final decision also shows application of the wrong standard.
The trial judge fails to address either prong of ldaho Code 12-117. Once again, the
trial judge appears to believe the standard is one of "frivolity". The Final Order on
February 18,2009 as follows:
"No new evidence was presented or testimony adduced that in any way alters the
previous determination of the Court;
The defense of this case was not frivoious;
The State of ldaho does not follow the English rule; and
There is no contractual or applicable statute upon which to base attornev's
fees." (emphasis added). Tr. at page 000120-000121.
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Smith believes neither ruling by the trial judge addresses (1) the reasonableness
of the "legal" basis or (2) the reasonableness of the "factual" basis of the County's
actions in this case.

This is not a case where facts are in dispute. The parties are in complete
agreement the County's position was that Smith was required to construct a 20 foot
wide driveway. Smith contended, successfully, that the County's own ordinance did not
require the same. The County contended at some point in the proceedings, that the
International Fire Code (IFC) controlled the driveway width statewide. Smith contended,
again successfully, that the County's own actions belied its assertion relative to the IFC.
More specifically, the County has two other fire districts which allow driveway widths
less than the County claims to be the statewide minimum width under the IFC.

E. American Rule:
Smith contends ldaho Code 12-117 is a statutory basis for awarding attorney's
fees and thus applies consistently with the American rule, because it is applicable to all
cases dealing with an agency. The district judge seemed to suggest that there was no
statutory basis upon which to award attorney's fees and cited the American rule as
controlling.

However, it is respectfully submitted that ldaho Code

statutory authority which governs all agency cases.
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12-117 is the

F.

Arbitrary and Capricious:

The argument being made by the County before this Court, i.e. that it was
"confused" about the legal standard it was required to follow, is disingenuous.

The

County made a finding of fact in its decision on the variance as follows (the decision on
the variance was the decision the trial judge ordered the County to make):
"Based upon the foregoing, the impact of the adoption of the IFC is that the IFC
is a state-wide minimum standard..." Tr. at page 000031.

The County's finding that there was a state-wide minimum driveway width, in
stark contradiction to the County's two different standards within its own borders, two of
which are under the alleged 20 foot minimum width of the IFC, was the subject of one
of the trial court's findings at Tr. page 000063-000064:
"However, the evidence presented indicates that there is confusion and a lack of
uniformity between the fire districts within Washington County as to the
interpretation and application of the IFC. This conflict in combination with the
actions of the Commissioners in failing to hold the required hearings and failing
to maintain documentation, leads to the conclusion that the decisions to deny Lhe
permit and variance are not only not supported by substantial evidence, but are
likewise arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion."

The County's policy to allow the Weiser and Cambridge fire districts (both within
the borders of the County of Washington) to require only 16 foot driveways widths, while
allowing Midvale to impose a 20 foot driveway width, is clearly arbitrary and capricious,
as well as an unwritten rule of the County. That finding alone is sufficient to invoke
attorney's fees under Idaho Code 12-117.
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The County is clearly not opposed to arguing whatever fits the situation at the
time, without concern for the truth, or its prior conflicting statements. It was one thing to
do so in front of the district court, but it is incredible the County continues to do so in
front of this Court on appeal. The County's brief claims at page 24:
"It interpreted its code the same way as it had done previously and even
provided a handout of the interpretation."
The County's statement above came after its brief claimed it followed the IFC,
claiming the IFC allows a district to impose more stringent standards. The County's
brief then contends that Midvale applied a more stringent standard than that allowed by
the IFC. That claim makes no sense. In the County's findings mentioned above (Tr. at
page 000031), the County found that the State's driveway width was a "minimum" statewide standard. The IFC, in effect at the time, required a 20 foot minimum. The
County's argument to this Court reveals the County's unwritten policy and a clear
contradictions between its policies, its findings, and its actual practice.

Furthermore, Midvale did not adopt a more stringent standard. Instead, Weiser
and Cambridge were allowed to violate the "statewide" standards. Midvale did not elect
a more stringent standard, it simply met the "statewide" standard. The district judge
was not fooled by the contradictions by the County. Smith was actually placed into an
untenable position.

The County's blatant disregard of its ordinances and its procedures is the evil
Idaho Code 12-117was intended to address.
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VII.
Minimization of Rights
A. Property Right:
The County apparently does not believe that the procedural wrongs inflicted on
the Smith family, including (1) failure to make a decision on the request for a building
permit, (2) the failure to issue a written decision upon which an appeal could have been
initiated, or (3) the failure to hold a hearing on the variance despite noticing it for
hearing, should be taken seriously.
Smith, as is the case with others dealing with an administrative agency, invest
money, time, and emotion into preparing for administrative proceedings. They deserve
to have them conducted in a proper and timely manner. The County of Washington
conducted the procedure in the case at bar as though it was a bother, not a duty. As
the trial judge found (and the record amply reflects), there was no decision made on
either the application for the building permit or the variance, until the Court ordered one.
Years of waiting to build a home and living in a barn is a violation of the LLUPA.
Likewise, failing to notify Smith that his variance hearing, noticed-up by the
County, was not really going to be a hearing, and that the publication of that notice was
simply a clerical mistake, is unforgivable. Smith and his witnesses came from Midvale,
and elsewhere, all taking time from their lives to testify in the advertised hearing. The
County did not attempt contact Smith ahead of time so he could alert the witnesses not
to come. The County just let them show up, then advising them a hearing was not be

Appellmt's Reply Brief

conducted, and that no decision would be made until the County was able to speak with
its attorney.
This Court has pointed out that applications for building permits implicate a
property right. Jerome County ex re Bd. Of Comm'rs v Holloway, 118 ldaho 681
(1990).

B.

Procedures and Decisions:

The LLUPA requires that local officials

support their decisions (if we can get them to make one at all) with written findings of
fact and conclusions of law, explained in a meaningful way. ldaho Code 67-6535(a).
ldaho Code 67-6535(a) provides that the approval or denial of any application shall be

based on standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the ...ordinances of the city
or county.
In the case at bar, the County of Washington failed to provide an ordinance
which applied to the driveway width to a single residence, as in the Smith case.
Consequently, Smith is the one who suffered when the County sought to have him
comply with an ordinance which clearly only applied to driveways serving more than
one residence. That application of the wrong ordinance by the County violated the
legislative mandate requiring Counties to do its business in a profession manner, with
regulations drafted in understandable language, and applied evenly to the entire
County. Washington County did not do so and without an award of attorney's fees,
despite winning the case, David Smith and his family will have lost in a very real way,
financially.
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It is respectfully noted that the intention of ldaho Code 12-117, ldaho Code 12120, and Idaho Code 12-121 is

to make a person whole after dealing with a

recalcitrant agency like the County of Washington.
Further, ldaho Code 67-6535(b) further provides that any approval or denial of
any application shall be in writing and accompanied with a reasoned statement which
explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, the relevant facts relied upon,
and the rationale for the decision based on the pertinent ordinances, statutory
provisions, and pertinent constitutional principles. Nothing remotely approaching the
statutory standards of ldaho Code 67-6535(b) was provided to Smith. No decision,
written or otherwise, was made by the County on David Smith's application for a
building permit. In fact, at one of the arguments as pointed out by Smith's first brief to
this Court, the County's attorney contended an application had not been filed with the
necessary septic permit.

In the very paperwork filed many weeks before the hearing,

David Smith's affidavit had the septic permit and the application attached. They had
been apparently lost by the County.

The district judge made such a finding.

We are governed by agencies in an increasing number o i ways. This Court
should send a wakeup call to the agencies, such as Washington County, that the
judiciary will enforce the legislature's enactments against them.
VIII.
IFC INAPPLICABLE ON ITS FACE
The County indicates in its briefing that there was a doubt about the applicability
of the IFC. Smith pointed out from the very beginning the existing IFC's scope clearly
did not apply.
Appellant's Reply Brief

IDAPA 18, TITLE 1, C I W T E R 50, Section 18.01.50 is the regulation adopted by the
State in reference to the IFC. The provision of the 2003 Jnternational Fire Code, which was in
existence and applicable to the present case, provides it's s e o ~ eto be:
"02. Scope. Pursuant to the authority provided by Scction 41-253, Idaho Code,
the Idaho Fire Marshal hereby adopts the 2003 cdition of the International Fire
Code in order to provide uniformitv in the plan review processfor "state owned"
and maintained buildings and to maintain consistency and conformity with the
International Building Code." See IDAPA 18, Title 01, Chapter 50, section
001.02." (emphasis added).
Despite the claim that this legislation must be followed and that it is a state-wide
standard, the 2003 IFC does not apply to anything other than "state owned and maintained
buildings".
The 2003 IFC also states it is for the purpose of providing uniformity. It hard to see
where the "uniformity" exists within Washington County when 2 of the three f i e districts are at
complete odds with the Midvale Fire District.

In addition to the new definition of "two",

Washington County has redefined ''u~~iforn~''
lo mean "not uniform"

CONCLUSION

When a litigant enters into a battle with an agency, Idaho Code 12-117 makes
the proceedings compatible with the American rule.

It is a special statute which

provides for mandatory attorney's fees if any party unreasonably proceeds without any
basis in law or without any basis in law. In the case before the Court, the District
Judge's findings and conclusions in the underlying case cannot be construed in any
manner other than that which triggers Idaho Code 12-117. On each of the findings and
on each of the conclusions, it is clear the County acted in contravention of ldaho Code

12-117.
Appellant's Reply Brief
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The reasonableness standard set forth in Idaho Code 12-117 has not been met
with regard to any factual determination by the County, nor by any legal determination
by the County.
Further, it is apparent from the findings and conclusion by the District Court on
David Smith's motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs, that the District Court
failed to apply the correct standards. Using the frivolity standard, the District Judge
failed to make a decision on Smith's most applicable attorney's fee right. The failure to
apply the proper standard would under normal circumstance require a remand to the
District Court. However, the findings and conclusions in the underlying case so clearly
show David Smith is entitled to an award, the Court is urged to reverse the District
Court's decision on the attorney's fees request and remand for proceedings to
determine the proper amount thereof.

2009
Dated: ~e~tembed?,

f l f%
K. Brad Masinaill
Attorney for ma id Smith
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